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Abstract
Care is central to the human experience and part of the social provisioning process. Adam
Smith recognized this, associating care with sympathy. Later contributions in the political
economy tradition also provide scope for an analysis of care, but none as developed as
Smith’s. With the emergence of the current mainstream, care is marginalized. Kenneth
Boulding’s analysis provides an opportunity to interrogate care in the economy, but he fails to
explicitly acknowledge care. It is left to feminist economics to highlight the centrality of
care. An implication is that it challenges the conventional rubric of economic organization
predicated on self-interest.
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1.

Introduction

The literature on care frequently refers to the broad definition provided by Bernice Fisher and
Joan Tronto in 1990:
“On the most general level, we suggest that caring be viewed as a species activity that
includes everything that we do to maintain, continue, and repair our ‘world’ so that we
can live in it as well as possible. That world includes our bodies, our selves, and our
environment, all of which we seek to interweave in a complex life-sustaining web”
(Fisher and Tronto, 1990: 40; Tronto, 1993: 103; Tronto, 2013: 19, original emphasis).
Accordingly, care is a complex and multi-dimensional concept. In subsequent works, Tronto
(1993, 2013, 2017) defends the breadth of the definition, arguing that it provides an
overarching frame within which specific forms of care may be nested. In short, care is
essential to the functioning of society and our being-in-the-world (Engster, 2005). Attentive
interest, concern, as well as subsequent activities and actions following such attention are all
manifestations of care and caring. For much of the literature, care is profoundly relational
(Himmelweit, 2007; Tronto, 2013). It has psychological (through emotional attachments and
motivations), labor (through the functional delivery of care activities), and philosophical
(through ethical considerations) properties (Engster, 2005; Tronto, 2013). Our purpose in this
respect, is to explore how the concept of care as an aspect of social provisioing emerged and
then virtually disappeared in economics.
In this paper, we trace and analyze the disparate and fragmented economic approaches to
care. ‘Approaches’ may be endowing too much in the way of acknowledgment, as we believe
that economists of all sorts – with the exception of feminist contributions – have either
overlooked or failed to appreciate the centrality of care to human existence. As Julie Nelson
(2016: 12) argues, “The place of care in the economy is everywhere.” Moreover, Virginia Held
(2006: 3) observes, “It [care] has the potential of being based on the truly universal experience
of care. Every human being has been cared for as a child or would not be alive.”
Perhaps as a consequence of the mechanical modelling associated with mainstream
economics (Nelson, 2006), at best, care is marginalized in economic thinking (Folbre, 1995).
This makes tracing a history of care in economic thought challenging. Nonetheless, to varying
degrees it is possible to locate a recognition of the conditions of care in the works of Adam
Smith, Karl Marx, and Thorstein Veblen. Thereafter, however, the trail becomes increasingly
faint, reflecting, we venture the change in core and periphery elements in economics following
the emergence and subsequent domination of thinking shaped by the utility maximizing
atomistic individual. In other words, the “social provisioning” (Power, 2004) approach of
political economy gave way to the scarcity, choice, and the optimization rubric of
neoclassicism and modern mainstream economics.
There is much discussion in the care literature that care presents a contrasting ethical
orientation to Kantian deontology, and consequentialism and utilitarianism (for example,
Edwards, 2009; Engster, 2005; Gilligan, 1982; Griffiths, 2008; Held, 2006; Noddings, 1984;
Tronto, 2013). Held (2006: 10) describes a care ethics as, “the compelling moral salience of
attending to and meeting the needs of the particular others for whom we take responsibility.”
Importantly, for Held, and in sharp contrast to deontology and consequentialism, an ethics of
care, “values emotion rather than rejects it” (Ibid.). Emotions, such as sympathy, empathy,
responsiveness, and sensitivity are viewed as central to an authentic caring. This position
aligns with a lineage in economic thinking from Adam Smith’s Theory of Moral Sentiments
(TMS) (Ballet, et al, 2018; Terjesen, 2011) to Nancy Folbre’s (1995) noted “Holding hands at
midnight” article and beyond.
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In our view, outlining a history of care in economic thought illuminates the possibility of a
platform for the development of a coherent conceptualization of care in economics. We
consider this a matter of some importance given that care theorists and some economists –
primarily feminist economists – argue that a caring approach would yield a different
configuration of economic institutions (Folbre, 1995; Nelson, 2006; Tronto, 2013; 2017). It
also reveals the inherent problems for some types of economics to take care seriously (Ballet,
et al, 2018; Davis and McMaster, 2017).
In section 2, we outline the principal aspects of the feminist economics approach to care, in
particular, caring labor. Feminist economics, we venture engages with the three dimensions
of care: ethical, labor, and psychological. In doing so, feminist economics re-energizes the
notion of social provisioning evident in earlier political economy and other approaches.
Section 3 discusses care in pre-neoclassical economic thought; specifically, the approaches
of Smith, Marx, and Veblen. To the best of our knowledge, other prominent figures in the
history of economics, such as Keynes, were not overly preoccupied with developing a
conception of care, given its perceived lack of relevance to the focus of their work. The
following section turns to Kenneth Boulding’s systems analysis. We find that Boulding’s work
provides important foundations for the interrogation of care, but we argue that he fails to
develop an explicit narrative on care. Section 5 considers care in mainstream economics.
Employing health economics as an illustrative case, we argue, at best care is marginalized in
the mainstream. Caring is subject to the whims of egocentric utility maximizers. The next
section returns to discussing feminist economics addresses the mainstream marginalization
of care, reinforces the responsibility to care, and recent attempts to place care at the center of
economic analysis. Section 7 concludes.
For us, feminist economics’ endorsement of social provisioning provides an important affinity
with (Classical) political economy and Kenneth Boulding. Feminist economists, such as,
Nancy Folbre (1995), Julie Nelson (2006), and Susan Himmelweit (1995, 2007) also explicitly
embrace the work of prominent thinkers in the care literature, such as Carol Gilligan (1982),
Virginia Held (2006), Joan Tronto (1993), and Kari Waerness (1984). In our view, these
features furnish feminist economics with the capacity to overcome much of the shortfall of the
mainstream literature in this area.
2.

Feminist economics: Caring labor and gender

In economic thinking, feminist economics has been, and remains the most significant source
of advancing the importance of care in the economy and economic behavior. In particular,
feminist economists argue that the shape of mainstream economic thinking marginalizes care
through its separation of the economy from society. Tronto (2013), for instance, argues that
Western thinking is infused by the difference between the polis and oikos (public and private)
in Ancient Greek philosophy. The former concerns politics and power, and the latter comfort
and care. The Cartesian dual between mind and body further reinforces this binary. Similarly,
Nelson (2003) alludes to the historical precedent provided by the Victorian model of the family
with male breadwinner and female homemaker. The domain of care is confined to the home
and is feminized. These approaches contribute to the visualization of the economy as
machine; the site of reason and knowledge, markets, self-interest, and so forth, and therefore
delineated as masculine. By contrast, the home is characterized as non-economic (i.e. nonmarket) and by virtue, emotion, care and compassion, and such like (Nelson, 2003; 2011).
Given the mechanical underpinnings of the neoclassical approach, the prospect of care
constituting its focal point are accordingly not promising. Thus, feminist economics
investigates and challenges this cleavage between economy and society, in general, and in
analyzing care, in particular. Feminist economists especially question the adequacy of
standard economic practice and method (for example, Folbre, 1986, 1995; Nelson, 2003).
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One particular issue identified is the value-ladeness and partiality of the conventional
approach. Economics is heavily gendered in its alleged objectivity, preference for
quantification, abstraction, rivalry, logical consistency, absence of emotion, rigor, and
hardness – properties associated with masculinity. By contrast, subjectivity, qualitative
approaches, co-operation, emotion, and intuition are associated with femininity, and are
characteristics that are usually considered inferior to masculine ones (for example, Bergmann,
1986; Nelson, 1995; 2006; 2016; van Staveren, 2001). At the center of this difference is the
selfish, disconnected, optimizing Homo economicus. Feminists argue that this is an utterly
inadequate account of both male and female behavior.
In developing our argument, we
acknowledge there are multiple threads in feminist thinking on care, although as we
understand it, much of the feminist economic literature centers on the labor dimension of
caring. Nonetheless, it is not possible in the space available to provide a comprehensive
discussion. Instead, what follows, we believe is illustrative of feminist thinking in the area.
Marilyn Power (2004) compellingly argues that feminist economics’ analytical entry point is
“social provisioning”, which she describes as social processes that emphasize the
interdependence of individuals in organizing to address their needs, wants and to socially
reproduce2. For present purposes, Power emphasizes caring labor and acknowledges its
ethical properties as integral to social provisioning. To a large extent this reflects the feminist
literature.
While there is unequivocal acknowledgement of the psychological and
philosophical as properties of care, much of the literature situates them in the context of caring
labor (for example, England, et al, 2002; Nelson, 2011; van Staveren, 2001; 2005; Wagman
and Folbre, 1996). From this, two prominent themes emerge: the undervaluation of caring
labor and relatedly, the disparities between female and male wages.
Considering the first theme, the origins of the undervaluation of caring labor lies in the location
of the domain of care as non-economic (the home), and hence not priced in the marketplace
(van Staveren, 2001). This oversight became increasingly apparent when women’s labor
force participation rates began to rise in the 1970s (especially in developed economies).
National income accounting methods then recorded income increases based on the
replacement of women’s unpaid labor in the household by paid labor in the market (both from
women’s market employment and from market replacement of formerly unpaid home labor
services), though essentially all that had happened was that the form of labor was different.
This made it clear that previously unaccounted, unpaid labor outside the market was valuable,
leading to the conclusion that national income accounting required that unpaid labor should
somehow be included (for example, Himmelweit, 1995; Ironmonger, 1996; Wagman and
Folbre, 1996). Though there were different ways in which this accounting could be done, all
of them involved placing a market value on the labor that went unpaid in non-market household
activity. This meant the ultimate arbiter of the value of unpaid labor was the market, and it
also held the further implication that unpaid labor had no value unless it could be measured in
market terms. This led to the question whether the market was an appropriate means of
evaluating unpaid labor.

2

Power identifies five components to what she views as a common methodology in Feminist
economics: (1) caring and unpaid labor as “fundamental”; (2) the application of well-being as a
measure of economic success, and intrinsic to interrogating economic reality are: (3) power relations
in economic, political and social processes; (4) ethical goals and values, (5) differences in race, class,
gender, and other group characteristics. Power (2004: 7) observes that the concept of social
provisioning is “classical” rather than “neoclassical” in origin. We agree in that neoclassicism (nor the
current mainstream) does not incorporate (1), (3), (4), or (5) in its analysis. In our view, standard
economics embraces a form of (2) founded on utilitarianism.
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Another tranche of the literature challenges the levels of remuneration associated with care
work (for example, England, et al, 2002; Folbre and Nelson, 2000). In particular, the argument
that caring labor involves some form of intrinsic satisfaction implies that there is a certain
motivational orientation in care work that may be undermined by higher wage levels. In other
words, there is a binary between “love and money” (Folbre and Nelson, 2000). By appealing
to extrinsic motivation in the form of monetary incentives, the intrinsic rewards of caring are
undermined. Essentially, this is a variation of Richard Titmuss’ (1971) classic comparative
study of blood donation in the US and UK. Money rewards for donations in the US led to
deteriorations the quality of blood supplied and undermined the civic virtues associated with
the practice as gift giving. By contrast, feminist economists dispute the applicability of
Titmuss’s finding in the context of caring labor. They contend that professional caring labor is
not solely synonymous with other-regarding (or externalities) in the form of altruistic motivation
to the point of self-sacrifice – as in a Mother Theresa type syndrome. Care work frequently
requires specific skills and knowledge. Such knowledge may only be acquired through
repeated interaction with the recipients of care, such as patients and children (Bergmann,
1986; Folbre and Nelson, 2000; Nelson, 2011). Far from crowding-out intrinsic motivation,
improving wage levels in care sectors acknowledges care workers’ contributions, and may
therefore reinforce intrinsic motivation and improve the quality of care by, for example,
reducing staff turnover (Nelson, 2006). This segues to the implications of the importance of
the relational dimension in caring labor. Himmelweit (2007: 585), for instance, persuasively
expresses an important implication of this:
“Caring because it is the development of a relationship, is manifestly an activity … in
which the output is the care itself … This means that it is hard to raise the productivity
of caring”.
In articulating this, Himmelweit draws on Baumol and Bowen’s (1965) analysis of the
economics of the arts. The authors argue that productivity rises more quickly in areas of the
economy that benefit directly from innovation, investment and/or technological enhancements.
However, the arts cannot benefit from these effects. Baumol and Bowen use the example of
a string quartet – reducing the number of players or demanding the musicians play more
quickly may raise productivity in terms of the number of pieces performed per musician over
a given time period, but would substantially alter the nature of the piece. The problem arises
from the attempted objectification of the arts. The same can be said about the nature of care.
The second theme (wage disparities between the sexes) follows. Under the standard
economic rubric, in competitive markets, wage levels reflect productivity. Feminists contend
that professional care occupations are predominantly staffed by women, and such work is
undervalued. This generates an obvious wage disparity between the sexes. In a noted
contribution to the literature, Folbre (1995) counters what she terms as “supply-side
arguments” advocated by the likes of Gary Becker and Victor Fuchs. In short, Fuchs (1988)
argues that females derive greater utility from children than males, and therefore
compensating differentials suggest that female wages will be lower than males’ as women
spend comparatively less time in the labor market. This is entirely rational and voluntary. For
Folbre this ignores the “demand-side”, which she describes in terms of collective action that
results in discrimination. Part of this argument relates to male collusion that excludes women
from highly-paid occupations, which crowds them into low-paid jobs. As the supply of women
increases for such roles, the wage rate is bid down.
In sum, feminist economics acknowledges the three central dimensions of care (labor,
philosophical, and psychological) identified in the care literature in the context of the economy
as the theatre of social provisioning. As we understand it, feminist economics privileges the
first of Power’s (2004) components (caring and unpaid labor) in its analytical approach. We
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believe that this represents a development of thinking informed by viewing the economy as a
provisioning process. We turn to tracing this out in sections 3 and 4, returning to reflecting on
how feminist economics arguably addresses the lacuna of care in contemporary economics
in section 6.
3.

Care in pre-neoclassical economic thought

As noted in section 2, Power (2004) explicitly situates social provisioning as a Classical
concept. Boulding (1986), for instance, attributes a notion of provisioning to Smith in which
the study of the economy concerns how society is organized on the basis of exchange, and
how society is provisioned. For Boulding, the second aspect incorporates the biosphere. In
an economy, provisioning commenced with the production of food, and therefore was
prominent in Classical analysis differentiated from commodities. The notion of social
provisioning, we feel informed thinking on care. In this section we discuss the contributions of
Adam Smith, Karl Marx and Thorstein Veblen on care. For us, Smith’s work, in particular
anticipates the feminist allusion to the relational aspect of caring.
3.1

Adam Smith and care

For most economists, the formative contribution to economics is Smith’s Wealth of Nations in
1776. The Wealth of Nations (WN) is frequently portrayed as establishing the basis for homo
economicus and the motivation of utility maximization (for example, Becker, 1976). Moreover,
Smith’s references to self-interest as the “energy source” that drive the “gears” of the economy
(for example, Nelson, 2006). The mechanistic metaphor crowds out feminine factors and
combined with Smith’s invisible hand metaphor provides a seemingly-powerful pro-market
message: the way markets work seems to ensure that the pursuit of self-interest will benefit
all. This is the vision promoted by the Chicago School.
Undoubtedly, Smith’s butcher-baker tale diminishes beneficence and benevolence in
generating material wellbeing. Yet to presume that this is all Smith said on the subject would
be to commit a grave error of omission (Garnett, 2019; Terjesen, 2011). As Jerry Evensky
(2005) argues, there are critical differences between the “Chicago Smith” and the “Kirkaldy
Smith” (sic)3. The Chicago School representation of Smith is highly reductionist in that it
ignores Smith’s moral philosophy as set out in TMS (Evensky, 2005; Samuels, 1977; Samuels
and Medema, 2005; Terjesen, 2011). For Evensky (2005: 203):
“Adam Smith was not an economist offering a materialist vision of humankind’s
progress based on the homo economicus assumption. Smith was a moral philosopher
modeling a complex coevolution of individuals within a simultaneous system of social,
political, and economic institutions.”
There is also reason to believe that Smith was concerned with strengthening the arguments
of TMS, which he worked on revising shortly before his death (Terjesen, 2011). He did not
devote this much attention to revising WN (Montes, 2003). There are also those who
emphasize the disjuncture between the apparent promotion of self-interest in WN and TMS,
as well as the inconsistencies within the WN itself (for example, Foley, 2006). We
acknowledge the debate and controversy over the two works (Garnett, 2019), but we are more

3

Evensky’s article misspells Smith’s birthplace. “Kirkaldy” is not “Kirkcaldy”. As far as we are aware,
there is no “Kirkaldy” in Fife, Scotland. There is, however, a “Kirkcaldy”.
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interested in what Smith stated explicitly about care in TMS, the expression of Smith’s ethical
thinking (Samuels, 1977)4.
At several points in TMS, then, Smith appears to anticipate later contributions to the theorizing
of care. For example, in his insightful analysis, Andrew Tejersen (2011) demonstrates that
Smith’s use of sympathy refers to “fellow feeling”, and hence emphasizes connectiveness and
relatedness between individuals. In other words, individuals are not the atomistic entities of
much of modern mainstream economics, but are socially situated. Sympathy is pivotal to
Smith’s analysis in TMS. It also highlights that for Smith, morality is inseparable from human
actions, including economic activities (Ballet, et al, 2018; Evensky, 2005; Garnett, 2019).
In TMS, Smith contrasts beneficence and justice. He observes that the former demands
gratitude whereas the latter does not. He notes that justice can be applied forcefully, whereas
beneficence is “free” and cannot be “extorted by force” (Smith, 2000 [1759]: 112). Further, he
associates beneficence with generosity, and how this requires an acknowledgement on the
part of the beneficiary of acts of beneficence. He argues that there is never a debt of charity,
generosity, or friendship, but there is a “debt of gratitude.” Smith develops his theme further
when he argues (2000 [1759]: 117):
“Beneficence and generosity we think due to the generous and beneficent. Those
whose hearts never open to the feelings of humanity, should, we think, be shut out in
the same manner, from the affections of all their fellow-creatures, and be allowed to
live in the midst of society, as in a great desert, where there is nobody to care for them,
or to enquire after them” (emphasis added).
Interestingly, Smith argues that beneficence is virtuous, and that there is an obligation on us
to recognize it as such. If an individual does not acknowledge beneficence (or benevolence),
then there is no obligation for the benefactor to continue to provide for the beneficiary. The
passage above reinforces Smith’s affinity to other-regarding features of human behavior (and
obligations to do so), and hence, in our view, emphasizes the social embeddness of the
individual. Smith’s invocation of “care for” also appears to anticipate the complexities of care
as relational, embodied in acts and emotions – primarily affection – as captured to some
degree by his notion of sympathy, and invoking benevolence and beneficence. He further
explores this in later parts of TMS on the foundation of judgments relating to individual
conduct, sentiments, and a sense of duty (Part 3), and in Part 5, Section 2 on the otherregarding properties of virtuousness. Indeed, Smith makes explicit reference to care in the
title of Chapter 1 of Section 2.
In discussing “just and unjust” conduct, Smith refers to the notion of “general rules” as
providing the foundations for standards of judgment. In terms redolent of Thorstein Veblen,
Smith argues that general rules are “fixed in our mind” by “habitual reflection” (2000 [1759]:
226). Moreover, these rules constrain individuals’ pursuit of self-interest at the expense of
regard for others. In our view, however, Smith appears to go further than arguing that social
rule systems are only constraints, since he uses a particular terminology, “correcting the
misrepresentations of self-love.” Further, Smith’s use of “habitual” and reference to “fixed in
our mind” suggest that rules instill values in our thought that are deemed culturally acceptable
(see also, Garnett, 2019). Thus, we believe Smith’s framing is consistent with the argument
that caring, as a virtue, is partly shaped by the system of rules governing social conduct and
relations.

4

Samuels identifies four domains to Smith’s approach to moral philosophy: natural theology; ethics;
justice, and concern for wealth (expediency). TMS explored ethics, and WN plutology.
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We venture further. When discussing virtue in Part 5, Smith represents care in terms of
concentric rings. “Every man, as the Stoics used to say, is first and principally recommended
to his own care” (2000 [1759]: 321). From the self, care as other-regarding extends to one’s
immediate family or kin – with greater sympathies directed at children – and then on to familiar
others. Place and relationality play an important role in Smith’s analysis here. His thinking
here is informed by David Hume’s preoccupation in his A Treatise of Human Behavior with the
issue of distance on morality (for example, Dow, 2002; Dow and Dow, 2006). For Smith,
distance does not make the heart grow fonder. This is due to the key role Smith ascribes to
habit: “What is called affection is in reality nothing but habitual sympathy” (2000 [1759]: 323),
and for this proximity is a key influence.
Care, then, is bound up with affection, sympathy, and virtue. It is, as we have seen, also
associated with beneficence and is deeply relational in Smith’s schema. Yet Smith readily
appreciates how the prevailing conditions of society may change general rules and therefore
the conduct of relations between individuals. He also draws a distinction between “pastoral”
and “commercial” countries, where the former do not possess legal frameworks sufficiently
developed to ensure the “security of every member of the state” (2000 [1759]: 326). In pastoral
societies different branches of a family and its associates coalesce to ensure their mutual
“security.” He suggests that in less developed societies deeper bonds exist between its
members, certainly at a local level, and that there is likely to be greater affection, sympathy
and care. With commercialization there is less need for such bonds, as the legal apparatus
assumes this function (on other aspects of Smith’s analysis of commercial societies, see
Witztum, 2008). This invites the question as to whether economic progress, in Smith’s
approach means that we care less for each other. Nonetheless, regardless of the state of
social development, Smith believes that mutuality and kindness are intrinsic to being human.
A sense of social provisioning is suggested from Smith’s inference of a virtuous cycle:
kindness generates kindness, and further, the well-being of individuals is founded on their
sociality. Kindness renews and replenishes: exercising kindness does not exhaust some
‘stock’. Indeed, Smith envisions a complex milieu in which socially connected individuals
negotiate their daily affairs by reference to social rules, and where care, affection, and
sympathy play a significant role in the conduct of their relations. Moreover, there is a certain
obligation, if not responsibility – witness the sense of duty noted earlier – in being otherregarding in Smith’s thinking. We return to this in section 6. Yet, while Smith explicitly refers
to care, he offers no precise definition. It seems evident that his understanding of care related
primarily the psychological dimension identified earlier, in that caring is fundamentally
emotional. His analysis entangles care with what he describes as virtuous properties of
human behavior: kindness, sympathy, beneficence, attention, affection, and so forth. It
appears that Smith was aware of the complex nature of care and caring – witness his
references to “nature” and kindness, the emphasis he placed on proximity and relations, and
the role of habit (and hence learning) in framing care. Yet as Tejersen (2011) recognizes,
Smith unfortunately introduced a gender bias in his account. Smith’s notion of “self-command”
over emotions was a decidedly masculine attribute. If care is viewed as possessing an
emotional element, then it becomes distinctly feminine, and therefore subject to
marginalization. Therein lies an unfortunate consequence. By invoking a gendered
understanding of care, Smith perhaps unintentionally sows-the-seeds of care’s shift to the
periphery of economic thinking.
3.2

Karl Marx

Marx shared with Smith an Aristotelian perspective, and from this develops a markedly
humanist orientation in his theoretical approach. Marx’s understanding of capitalist market
exchange addresses the conflict between market-based interactions and social conditions that
8

would facilitate care. Specifically, in Chapter 1 of Volume 1 of Capital, in what he terms the
“fetishism” of the commodity, Marx argues that exchange value always dominates use value.
Indeed, he speculates that if commodities could speak they would say: “We relate to each
other merely as exchange-values” (Marx, 1990 [1867]: 177). In other words, the value of all
things comes to be measured by prices – a monetary measure of the value for which a ‘thing’
can be exchanged. This monetization of things contaminates and corrupts other values in
social relations, and collectivism and co-operation give way to individualism and exploitation.
Thus, the prospect for care and caring beyond the self, and other-regarding attitudes and
behaviors, is seriously diminished.
A manifestation of this that preoccupied Marx is the length of the working day. The exploitative
nature of production relations always acts to lengthen the working day and limit the time
workers have to attend to their social and other needs, and is accordingly dehumanizing.
Nonetheless, the concept of care is not directly evident in Marx’s analysis, and his thoughts
about it can only be inferred from other things he says. To our knowledge, where Marx does
employ the term “care” its meaning is either as a burden (as all the cares of the World) or as
an exercise of diligence, such as, “the capitalist takes good care that the work is done in a
proper manner” (1990 [1867]: 291). This treatment of care is not surprising given the pivotal
role of conflict in Marx’s analysis. Yet, given his humanist orientation indicates that there can
be no moral equivalence between people and machines. Moreover, Marx’s emphasis on value
theory and his critique of the monetization of social relations, provide a platform for the
circumstances of care and caring. Indeed, the Marxist emphasis on production relations and
the reproduction of those relations is the basis of a definition of care, and conceptualizing care
as central to human existence (for example, Davis and McMaster, 2017; Folbre, 1995;
Schwarzenbach, 1996). Moreover, Marx’s historical and material dialecticalism powerfully
signals a change in dominant value structures underpinning production and wider social
relations. It is therefore not inconceivable that, for example, Marx’s conception of “primitive
communism” points to a more caring society in that it is typified by sharing and co-operation
than the materially wealthier “capitalism” at the focus of his writing. Indeed, this echoes
Smith’s allusion to the effects of commercialization, noted earlier Marx’s vision of a communist
society that eventually succeeds capitalism appeals to a more caring sense of social relations.
Tronto (1993), for example, notes that Marx’s analysis proposes that under capitalism,
frequently the individual (proletarian) cannot see much beyond their own plight in order to be
other-regarding; so that capitalist relations are almost necessarily around care-for-the-self.
However, when an individual’s own needs are sufficiently met they become increasingly
sensitive to the needs of others. Here the potential for the relational aspect of care and caring
is reiterated.
3.3

Thorstein Veblen and the “parental bent”

The final figure we highlight is Thorstein Veblen. While Veblen’s approach resonates with
social provisioning, it is less obvious which of Power’s components he emphasizes. Veblen
obviously articulates the economy as subject to evolutionary forces and furnishes a fuller
psychology of human behavior. He explored this in his The Instinct of Workmanship and the
State of the Industrial Arts (TIW) published in 1914.
Veblen’s theoretical analysis of human behavior was heavily influenced by American instincthabit psychology (Hodgson, 2004). He believed that human instincts are part of our
evolutionary biology in the form of innate and persistent propensities and drives (for example,
Camic and Hodgson, 2011; Kologlugil, 2016). He identified three basic instincts, including;
“workmanship”, which is an impulse to work to make things useful; “idle curiosity”, which refers
to humans’ drive to comprehend the external world, perhaps through imagination; and the
9

“parental bent” (Veblen, 2011). The parental bent is explicitly other-regarding and far broader
than the, “mere proclivity to the achievement of children” (Veblen, 2000 [1914]: 16). It is:
“Beyond question that this instinctive disposition has a large part in the sentimental
concern entertained by nearly all persons for the life and comfort of the community at
large, and particularly for the community’s future welfare” (Veblen, 2000 [1914]: 17).
Veblen depicts the parental bent as a “naïve impulse” (Ibid.) that is manifest in two ways: an
active interest in common good, and hence other-regarding, and a bias to the future. He
contends that there is an “unselfish solicitude” (2011: 561) expressed as a concern for the
“highest efficiency” (Ibid.) to ensure the well-being of the in-coming generation. In other words,
current generations make sacrifices to enhance the life chances of the young.
Despite identifying the parental bent as one of the two most important human instincts – the
other being workmanship – Veblen devotes remarkably little text to exploring and elaborating
upon it. As the title of his work indicates, the principal focus is workmanship. That said, he
does consider how the two instincts may relate to one another in guiding behavioral impulses.
Instincts are translated via habits into behavior, and through habits instincts may become
corrupted. Veblen illustrates the parental bent in the context of paternalistic authoritarian rule
by elders in some tribal societies, and how the perpetuation of particular habits leads to an
institutional pattern that demarcates clear class distinctions. Other than this, Veblen does not
develop the parental bent concept, or explicitly relate it to the terminology of care.
Nevertheless, for us it is clear that Veblen’s conceptualization strongly resonates with notions
of care and caring. The instinctive property is an obvious corollary. Within this, Veblen’s
delineation of care is expressed by other-regarding, concern or interest, and a future
orientation. Again, these constitute aspects of care and caring, and seems to engage with the
psychological dimension through emotional disposition. Moreover, Veblen’s emphasis on the
future is consistent with Fisher and Tronto’s (1990) definition and suggests a sentiment
promoting the sustainability aspect to care perhaps not evident in Smith. What remains
unexplored in Veblen’s analysis, yet constitutes an important part of Smith’s approach, is the
idea of care as a virtue. This may be unsurprising given the respective orientations of Smith’s
TMS and Veblen’s TIW, and perhaps this deserves some reflection on the possibilities of
synergies between Smith and Veblen’s analyses of care. Nonetheless, in the relevant parts
of TIW Veblen makes no reference to Smith.
Of the three figures identified, Smith provides the most thorough examination of care, and yet
his thinking is under-elaborated and potentially gender-biased. Veblen’s allusions are indirect
and under-developed, whilst Marx provides only a hint of the conditions involved in caring,
which can be inferred from his excoriating critique of the corrupting effect of the monetization
of social relations. Given that care was not the primary focus of these authors there is only a
disjointed, fragmented approach to care. For instance, Marx’s Aristotelian roots and
humanism are suggestive of an emphasis on care, but one has to read between the lines to
discern this. In the case of Veblen, the parental bent is presented as one of the two most
important human instincts; nevertheless, as noted, it is subsequently under elaborated in his
work. Neither Marx nor Veblen establish any overt references to responsibility in providing
care, whereas Smith infers some obligation. Yet to varying degrees, all three anticipated later
developments in theories of care. We turn to Kenneth Boulding’s systems approach to the
social provisioning economy.
4.

Kenneth Boulding: Recapturing early Classical promise?

As an economist Kenneth Boulding is perhaps best known for his interdisciplinary approach
to the analysis of the economy, which reflected his systems-based and evolutionary analyses
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(Dolfsma and Kesting, 2013), and his strong belief that all sciences are infused with values,
economics being no exception (Boulding, 1969; Davis, 2013).
Boulding’s system-based approach appeals to social provisioning. Indeed, Boulding (1986)
chastises “neoclassical” economics in failing to appreciate this Classical insight. He states:
“Modern economics has gone wholly towards the view of economic life as society
organized by exchange, and has largely lost sense of it being a process of provisioning
of the human race, or even the whole biosphere” (1986: 10).5
Boulding endorses (“his beloved”) Adam Smith’s notion of the provisioning of society. For
Boulding, it highlights a hierarchy of entities necessary to fulfil species functioning and (social)
reproduction. Under standard economics, according to Boulding each commodity assumes
equality in a society organized solely on the basis of exchange. Arguably, this entails the
conflation of needs and wants, and assumes individual autonomy. By contrast, understanding
of the economy as a process of social provisioning suggests a differentiation between needs
and wants and human interdependency.
Boulding’s second point, above on the nesting of science in values has some bearing on our
argument. Boulding is forthright in asserting that science is a human activity that occurs within
a community, and all communities and human activities are types of culture that provide ethical
guidance regarding what is right and wrong. Therefore, science cannot be divorced from
morality. In his 1968 American Economics Association address, Boulding denounces the
ethical foundations of Pareto optimality, arguing that it precludes malevolence and
benevolence from socio-economic activities (Boulding, 1969).
Benevolence, of course, is what Smith in TMS connected with care and other-regarding. By
this argument, then, almost at the outset of its analysis the mainstream marginalizes care.
Boulding’s (1969; 1973) assessment is predicated on his three systems of social organization
conception, the “threat”, “exchange”, and “integrative” systems. In the threat system the
dominant motive is fear; in contrast the integrative system is dominated by love. The systems
overlap and evolve. Boulding argues that the integrative system sustains the exchange
system: benevolence gives rise to reciprocity, a pre-requisite for exchange (Boulding, 1973).
However, he also notes that the exchange system is partially shaped by the threat system,
which is also influenced by the integrative system. The threat system is the basis of power
politics, as exchange is the basis of economics. In his many works on this he describes the
multitude manifestations of the threat system, frequently summoned by the State. Thus,
Boulding refers to an evolution of spiritual threats, legally sanctioned coercion, physical threat,
slavery, and so forth throughout human history.
Love centers on other-regarding through identification. Boulding argues that there are areas
of life that do not involve exchanges or threats, but in which we identify with others. He (1973)
describes love of spouse, family, country and so on as part of our identity. Boulding further
argues that the three systems depend on learning. Without learning benevolence would not
lead to reciprocity; without learning we would not appreciate the nature of subtlety in the threat
system and threats would be reduced to the coarse exercise of physical power. Through
learning, Boulding reinforces his case that all sciences are morally based. He demonstrates
this with even greater specificity in his study of need and health care.

5

We are grateful to an anonymous reviewer for bringing Boulding’s view on this to our attention.
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Drawing from the overarching notion of provisioning, Boulding commences his argument from
the proposition that needs and wants are profoundly different. As in market exchange
systems, demand represents individual choice and autonomy whereas need refers to the
choices of others made on one’s behalf, inferring an absence of autonomy and the presence
of dependency. For Boulding this may be related to what he terms as “homeostatic need”,
which is what is required to maintain the operability (or functionality) of a given system. To
demonstrate the ethical challenges of this, Boulding draws a comparison between cars and
humans – both need fuel of various types, produce waste, are subject to physical deterioration,
and frequently requires specialist professionals for the purposes of maintenance. He argues
that basing need on homeostasis is never successful, as no matter what the nature and
combination of inputs, “virtually all known organisms and organizations exhibit the
phenomenon of aging … Aging introduces a very tricky problem into the concept of need for
maintenance” (Boulding, 1966: 206-7). When is it appropriate to cease maintaining
something? Boulding argues that this is problematic enough with a machine, where present
value calculations can be used, but one of “excruciating delicacy” (1966: 207) in the case of a
human being. He observes (Ibid.):
“A machine is generally regarded as having no value in itself … its value is purely
instrumental … In the case of the human being, the problem of the person himself
becomes very acute, because persons cannot be regarded as purely instrumental.
That is, they are not merely good for something else, they are good in themselves.
They are, in other words, something for which other things are good” (original
emphasis).
Boulding’s privileging of humans has an obvious affinity with the tenor of an ethics of care,
and moreover appears intuitively appealing from Aristotelian and Kantian perspectives, and
sharing a lineage with Smith, Marx, and Veblen. Nonetheless, for us, there is a lacuna in
Boulding’s stimulating analysis: there is no explicit mention or reference to care. Care and
caring may be inferred from his emphasis on professional values and his situating medical
provision in the integrative system with its dominant value of benevolence, but surprisingly
Boulding makes no particular virtue of caring. The central characteristic of the integrative
system, the bonding effect of love via identity, is similar to the familiarity and care argument
articulated by Smith in TMS. Yet the absence of explicit reference to care and caring is
disappointing. Boulding provides the platform, but seems to overlook its potential in examining
care. For this, we must turn to feminist economics. For now, we focus on mainstream or
standard economics and care.
5.

Mainstream economics and care: Never the twain shall meet?

It seems reasonable to argue that care is not prominent in the mainstream economic literature.
Leaving aside this seeming incongruity with the universality of care and caring in human
behavior, this section outlines the approaches to care in the mainstream literature. We do not
endeavor to be comprehensive here, again merely illustrative. We note that branches of the
mainstream, such as family economics (for example, Becker, 1981; Bergstorm, 1996) refer to
“care” as a source of utility and in the context of repeated games. Nonetheless, we
demonstrate our argument through health economics, which, like family and labor economics
employs standard techniques. Our principal reason being that we are most familiar with health
economics.
In her insightful contrastive analysis of the economic modelling of care, Irene van Staveren
(2005) observes that the standard approach treats care in different ways. Some models
include “care” as a time allocation decision variable in the supply of labor, usually between
paid labor, unpaid labor, as proxy for care, and leisure. Care may also be modelled as a
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category of leisure. Such models endogenize care by assigning a price vector, such that care
therefore assumes a monetized opportunity cost. Thus, as with any other standard
commodity, care is a declining function of price. Its responsiveness to price changes may
then be modelled as a means of investigating gender labor market issues, such as wagegaps. If the division of care in a household is mainly assumed by women, which is translated
into a household preference function, then the opportunity costs of care will differ between the
genders. There is no acknowledgement of the meanings or values of caring relationships.
For van Staveren (2005: 582), such models can only provide insight into what she terms as
the “economic structure of care”, i.e., time allocation decisions across a range of activities.
We argue that standard health economics is no different from the rest of the mainstream in its
treatment of care as a marginal issue. However, where care does feature in standard
analyses, either explicitly or by implication, it is treated in two overlapping ways: as altruism
and/or social capital. In effect, care is modelled as interdependent utility functions between at
least two economic agents: it is an externality. Indeed, some health economists are explicit
about this. For example, Culyer (1976) refers to “humanitarian spillovers” between the wider
population and those who are ill. Bobanic, et al, (2010) describe care interventions as
“spillovers” on “significant others”. For Mooney and Ryan (1993), a “caring externality” in an
agent’s utility function generates a benefit flow to this agent from the knowledge that other
members of the population have the ability to access health care regardless of their ability to
pay. Wiseman (1997) presents a refinement in associating process utility with care, arguing
that utility may be derived from the act of caring or giving, as well as the consequences of
care-giving. Drawing from Margolis’ (1982) fair shares model, Wiseman contends that
individuals possess two utility functions: one deriving from “selfish utility” and the other from
group or social activities. The dual utility function approach is a heuristic device to account for
how seemingly irrational acts, seen from a strictly selfish perspective – such as altruistic care
giving at personal cost – can be explained as rational acts consistent with utility derived
socially (Davis and McMaster, 2015).
Treating care as an externality makes it as an aspect of social capital, since most contributions
to this approach define social capital in terms of non-rivalrous public goods (Folland, 2006) or
overtly as an externality (Portes, 1998). Indeed, the social capital literature supposes that
caring social relationships have powerful beneficial effects (for example, Dahl and MalmbergHeimonen, 2010).
Yet the standard economic conceptualization of care, in general, and in health economics, in
particular is subject to profound logical problems.
For example, the notion of a ‘caring externality’ is problematic in that the spillover is not on a
third-party, as in the usual understanding of an externality, but to one of the parties in the
caring relation. Modelling care via interdependent utility functions (for example, Wiseman,
1997) suggests that the care provided is additional to the activities delivered. Specifically,
medical treatment is delivered to a patient whether or not the clinician is particularly caring.
This is problematic, since on the standard view, caring defined as an externality limits it to a
secondary, non-essential type of factor since a commodity is provided regardless of the
supplier’s caring preferences. If care is an externality, it is then by definition a second-order
concern to the pursuit of individual utility. Where the two conflict, there is a tendency for care
to be crowded out. Ethical motives are always at risk when economic ones dominate (Davis
and McMaster, 2015; 2017). Indeed, Ballet, et al (2018) in citing Mahieu (2001) observes that
by treating concern for others as an externality introduces a moral equivalency in choosing
between the consumption of a particular cheese and assisting one’s grandmother.
Regard for others features prominently in the so-called behavioral turn in mainstream
economics (for example, Davis, 2008; Hargreaves Heap, 2013). Moreover, emotions, such
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as guilt and envy have been incorporated into mainstream models (Ballet, et al, 2018). Yet
such initiatives tend to theoretically proceed from the examination of anomalies to the standard
rational choice model (Hargreaves Heap, 2013), and therefore do not represent an
abandonment of, but an amendment to homo economicus. Indeed, Shaun Hargreaves Heap
argues that the new behavioralism in economics appeals to the mainstream in part due to its
methodological frame, which centers on ‘as if’ reasoning.
Arguably, incorporating emotions into a utility function is reductionist in that an emotion is
confined to the properties of any other argument in a utility function; namely, a single
measurable dimension. In effect, by theorizing care as other regarding in terms of
interdependent utility functions, the standard approach conflates care with its interpretation of
altruism, sympathy, and emotions, more generally.
Elias Khalil (2003) provides an insightful analysis of the examination of altruism. He
distinguishes three approaches: ‘egoistic’, where altruism revolves around the expectation of
the accrual of future benefits to the altruist; ‘egocentric’, where there is an interdependency of
utilities, and ‘altercentric’, which, for Khalil refers to a particular personality trait, where, for
instance, an individual is pre-disposed – regardless of (monetary) incentives – to be otherregarding. Thus, an altercentric individual may be inclined to behave altruistically by virtue of
their ability to demonstrate concern for another where this concern is not self-centered.
Mainstream theorizing presents only a specific form of care and altruism, and one that fails to
acknowledge social context. Limiting its analytical prospectus to the egoistical variant means
that the standard account rests entirely on an individualistic basis in that it does not appeal to
a moral obligation associated with a particular social role (Davis and McMaster, 2017).
Therefore, in our view, this gives altruism, and hence care an ephemeral quality, which is
sensitive to the whims of a particular individual and is not necessarily socially embedded in a
sense of duty or responsibility.
6.

A return to feminist economics: Addressing mainstream neglect?

Our understanding of care in economics to some extent rests on viewing the economy as a
process of social provisioning in the sense expressed by Marilyn Power (2004). Such a lens
is evident in pre-neoclassical thinking. Arguably, Smith provides the antecedents for the
conceptualization of care in economic behavior. Veblen enriches this through his habit-instinct
psychological perspective but fails to sufficiently develop care beyond its instinctive property.
Boulding’s systems analysis augments Smith’s association of care with a particular set of
values, such as sympathy. Unfortunately, to the best of our knowledge, beyond some isolated
favorable citations of Smith (for example, Bergstorm, 1996), mainstream economics does not,
and perhaps cannot retain the notion of social provisioning, which is arguably necessary but
insufficient for an appreciation of care. As we understand it, the standard economic approach
to care is reductionist in that it is highly sensitive to an individual agent’s preferences, and
therefore is solely the subject of an optimizing decision rubric with the moral equivalent of
commodity choice. In contemporary economics, it is left primarily to feminist economics to
address this neglect.
We emphasize two cases where feminist economics is deepening the understanding of care
in the economy. The first centers on the philosophical dimension, specifically responsibility.
The second, outlines some recent work on care regimes and economic growth.
The standard economic rationalization of the disproportionate distribution of caring labor
activities on females, as we noted, rests on preferences, such as women having greater predisposition to childcare (for example, Fuchs, 1988). Such arguments ignore the philosophical,
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specifically ethical aspect of care. The broader care literature examines how much
dependencies are associated with the assumption of responsibility for care provision, inter alia
(for example, Engster, 2005; Tronto, 1993, 2013). Unlike the egocentric altruistic explanation
of the mainstream, which makes no reference to social roles, the notion of responsibility refers
to a set of moral obligations potentially nested in an individual’s social roles, for example by
virtue of parenthood or a particular occupation. These responsibilities emerge regardless of
the individual’s preferences, at least in the conventional economic sense. Feminist economics
has recognized the heavily gendered aspect to caring responsibilities (for example, Folbre,
1986; Himmelweit, 1995).
Recently, Nelson (2016) has attempted to promote a masculine-oriented ethic and practice of
care through the invocation of the “masculine term, ‘husbandry’”. In its traditional meaning,
husbandry is associated with “careful cultivation” and “management” (Nelson, 2016). In other
words, it is is evocative of ethical properties of attentiveness and responsibility in productive
activities. This, she argues markedly contrasts with the “robotic profit-maximizer … or
industrial worker, financialized masculinity” (Nelson, 2016: 5, original emphasis) of standard
economic accounts of behavior founded on homo economicus. Husbandry requires skill and
creativity, as well as care, suggesting that the latter is by no means an exclusively feminine
preserve. In a powerful conclusion, Nelson (2016: 12) writes:
“Caring is a human trait, and care is a human responsibility, in all areas of life in which
we find ourselves. Men who neglect their capability to care are less fully men. An
economy that neglects care advances toward only greed, robotic work and ecological
destruction” (emphasis added).
Although feminist economics transcends methodological boundaries, with the employment of
mainstream techniques in the investigation of caring labor, in particular, it nevertheless
challenges the adequacy of standard practice, especially the value-ladeness of homo
economicus (for example, Nelson, 2003). Nelson (2016) appeals for a reconsideration of one
of the tenets of the standard approach. Homo economicus is the unthinking, robotic pursuit
of utility maximization. According to Nelson’s argumentation it is thus dehumanizing, and
therefore incongruous with an adequate conception of care.
Going beyond the ethical attributes of care, feminist economists also investigate care in terms
of social reproduction. Elissa Braunstein and colleagues’ work (for instance, Braunstein, et
al, 2018) on social reproduction and economic growth provides an illustrative example.
Braunstein, et al attempt to incorporate care into a Kaleckian based model. Again, gender
features prominently as they acknowledge care as an output and an aspect of labor-process,
disproportionately provided by women. The authors model care in echoes of Keynes’ “animal
spirits” in what they term as “caring spirits”. This is described as investments in human
capacities that reflect social norms and individual motivations to care. They claim this is
reflected in the structure of the social welfare state. There is an affinity with a varieties of
capitalism type analysis in that Braunstein, et al are then able to present categorical measures
for the purposes of modelling. Moreover, it potentially develops a theory of care from a (Post)
Keynesian perspective, which to all intents and purposes has been largely absent (McMaster,
2018).
Care, then is clearly a central concern for feminist economics, and arguably its adoption and
development of the notion of social provisioning associated with Classical political economy
facilitates elaboration. The narrower foundation of mainstream economics suggests that it can
only present a rather superficial account of care in the economy.
7.

Conclusions
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We believe that charting the history of care in economic thought is important as it serves at
least two purposes: first, that prominent figures in a more political economy tradition at least
acknowledged care as a feature of economic life. Second, with the emergence of what is now
mainstream economics, care was (and is) marginalized in the conceptualization of human
behavior. Those areas of standard economics that attempt to model care, such as family and
health economics, reduce it to an argument in an interdependent utility function. In doing so,
care has the moral equivalence of any commodity. This may render modelling easier in tracing
utility maximizing individuals’ choice sets but generates questionable ethical issues. Is care
really equivalent to a commodity?
The systems approach of Kenneth Boulding provides an insightful means of challenging the
moral equivalence of care and commodities in the standard approach. Boulding’s thinking
questions the basis of treating care as an externality and demonstrates the reductionist tenor
of the mainstream. Under Boulding’s schema, the standard approach is confined to the
exchange system, and care would be located in the integrative. While these two systems are
not entirely discrete, there remains the issue as to whether care can be adequately understood
by an approach solely nested in the exchange system. Yet, whilst Boulding’s analysis is
promising from the perspective of furnishing a deeper understanding of care, it is frustratingly
under-developed in that, at least to the best of our knowledge, Boulding makes no explicit
reference to care.
It is left to feminist economics to develop a richer understanding of the importance of care.
Here there is no avoidance of the complexities of care, nor its ethical underpinnings. The
origins of the care concept in feminist social science, economics, and philosophy lie in
recognition of social provisioning and within this the importance of unpaid labor in non-market
domains. Feminist economics, in our view resuscitates and augments the insights of the
political economy conception of social provisioning, such as power structure and ethical
framing in an evolutionary dynamic. More specifically, this analysis acknowledges the
relational aspect of care and caring. Having a caring attitude, involves not just an orientation
on the part of the caregiver, but also a personal engagement with the overall well-being of the
recipient of care. This thinking recalls Smith’s early view of care as bound up with affection,
sympathy, and virtue. The feminist agenda on care is challenging, then, in that its implications
confront the conventional rubric of economic organization predicated on self-interest. What if
homo economicus was usurped by homines curans (Tronto, 2017)?
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